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ABSTRACT
Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for
his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural
Senses View and theArgument from EmptyOntology. I argue that, first, the Plural
Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his
ontological claims; second, theArgument from EmptyOntology can be debunked
by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true
unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments
show the instability of Parfit’s claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 January 2017; Accepted 13 September 2017
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1. Introduction
When theories require the addition of abstract objects into their ontology, this
is often taken to be a cost for these theories. In this context, abstract objects
(abstracta) are those that do not exist in space-time; concrete objects (concreta)
are those that do. DerekParfit (2011, 2017a) argues that his irreducibly abstract1
objects – reasons – are not costs for his theory because existence truths about
reasons are true in a ‘non-ontological sense’.2 By this, he means that they are
not made true by corresponding to any part of reality, so that we do not need
to introduce reasons into our ontology at all.3 In this manner, Parfit holds that,
when we say there exist or are reasons in his ‘non-ontological sense’, we do
not mean that they exist in the way in which medium-sized dry goods exist
in space and time, nor as objects that are merely possible, existing in possible
worlds. Nor do we mean, as some Platonists hold, that they exist like numbers
in some non-spatio-temporal reality. For claims about reasons to be true, Parfit
holds, we do not need to populate a world with objects at all. Furthermore,
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Parfit claims, some other truths, such as mathematical truths and logical truths,
are also true in this ‘non-ontological sense’. This is not to say that these are
fictional truths, or deflated truths. Parfit emphasizes that these truths are ‘in
the strongest sense’, true (479).
Parfit’s claims here matter for at least three reasons. First, the metaethical
space may be radically reconfigured if Parfit is correct. If existence just needs
to be understood in particular ways to allow for objective truth without on-
tological commitment, then a strong motivation for naturalist and nominalist
theories would be undermined. Second, other cognitivists have found con-
ceptions of ‘non-ontological’ moral properties and objects appealing.4 Finally,
theorists such as Gibbard and Railton are now convinced that their metaethical
views are compatible with, or converge to, Parfit’s own on the basis of these
ontological claims (Gibbard 2017; Railton 2017).5
In this essay, I argue that this style of ontologically cost-free cognitivism is
not established by Parfit’s arguments. My primary purpose is to establish the
claim that Parfit does not have the resources to show that abstracta do not
come with ontological commitments. More particularly, I use two independent
arguments to show that Parfit does not avoid ontological costs, and I think
these arguments put pressure on others who want to adopt similar cognitivist
positions. My secondary purpose is to argue that Parfit’s views on truth suggest
that positions such as his are ontologically committal for abstracta. I argue that,
if one wants to maintain the attractive position that claims about concreta and
claims about abstracta are both true in the strongest sense, then this will
lead to ontological commitment. In contrast, it has historically been a central
motivation in favour of naturalist metaethical positions that they do not need
to make contentious ontological appeals. One role that this discussion could
play is reviving this parsimony motivation for naturalist metaethics.
In Section 2, I argue that Parfit’s Plural Senses View is incomplete. Unless
he can motivate the claim that the correct ontology contains only concrete
objects, he is merely question-begging when he claims abstract objects exist in
a non-ontological sense. This is because he does not show that abstract objects
could not exist in an alternative ontological sense.
In Section 3, I specify what this alternative ontological sense would mean
and how it would differ from Parfit’s non-ontological sense. In the process, I
address Parfit’s claim that the discussion is confused because there is ‘No Clear
Question’ about abstract ontology.
In Section 4, I consider objections to the alternative ontological sense
concerning existence, defending it against claims that the ontological sense
is ill-formed or that it is part of a merely verbal distinction.
In Section 5, I address Parfit’s objection to this sense, specifically that it is
undermined by what I call his Argument from Empty Ontology. I claim that the
Platonist can reject or debunk the intuition behind the Argument from Empty
Ontology.
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In Section 6, I make a positive argument to show that Parfit’s claims about
truth do commit him to abstract ontology. He holds that claims about concreta
and abstracta are both true in the strongest sense. However, the strong theories
of truth – broadly speaking, so-called ‘inflationary’ theories – are ontologically
committal and the weak theories – broadly speaking, so-called ‘deflationary’
theories – will not vindicate his claims about concreta (and furthermore are
also not strong senses of truth).
InSection 7, I discuss the implications of this discussion.SinceParfit’s positive
arguments for adopting his ontologically cost-free position fail, and since there
are difficulties in determining how a theory of truth would not lead towards a
more ontologically costly position, I hold that the metaethical rapprochement
evidenced in Parfit (2017a) and Singer (2017) rests on an insecure foundation.
2. Making sense together
Parfit holds that existence claims can be read in different ‘senses’. For the
sake of argument, I grant that they can be understood and distinguished in
the way he describes. I also grant his claim that existence claims can be read
in multiple ways, i.e. that ‘exists’-style verbs can have different ontological
implications – although this is a controversial thesis.6 In this section, I argue
that his arguments give us no reason to reject the claim that (at least some)
abstracta could exist in an ontological sense, a claim he requires in order to
reconfigure the metaethical landscape. In other words, his arguments do not
help show that abstracta come without a cost when considering a contrasting
metaphysical view (which we can broadly speaking call Platonist, following
Parfit and the debate in philosophy of mathematics).7
There are two categories of objects that can be said to exist: concreta and
abstracta. Furthermore, Parfit holds that there is a distinction between ways in
which something can be said to exist: ontologically or non-ontologically. These
cross-cutting distinctions give us four (potential) ‘narrow’ types of existence
claims. Parfit endorses two: the ontological existence of concreta and the non-
ontological existence of abstracta. If any of these four potential narrow types
of existence holds for any object (abstract or concrete), then that object can be
said to exist in a ‘wide sense’:8
Plural Senses View: There is one wide, general sense in which we can claim that
there are certain things, or that such things exist. We can also use these words
in other, narrower senses. For example, if we say that certain things exist in what
I call the narrow actualist sense, we mean that these things are, at some time,
actually existing concrete parts of the spatio-temporal world…There are also, I
have claimed, some abstract entities, such as some logical and normative truths,
which exist in a distinctive, non-ontological sense. (719, my emphasis)
The wide sense of existence holds of any object (concrete or abstract) about
which one can make positive true claims (734–735).9 The ‘narrow actual-
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ist sense’10 is used in true existence claims about concreta that are part of
one’s ontology in the spatio-temporal part of the actual world.11 The ‘narrow,
non-ontological sense’ is used in true existence claims about abstracta that are
not part of one’s ontology. Thus, they neither exist concretely in space and
time, nor do they exist in any non-spatio-temporal part of reality.
It could be that Parfit is simply stipulating that abstracta and concreta
exist in these narrow senses. However, this would be rather unsatisfying,
leaving us with no reason to accept these ontological claims. Furthermore,
mere stipulation would undermine the putative agreement that Parfit has
developed with other more naturalist metaethical views (Gibbard 2017; Parfit
2017a; Railton 2017).
More weakly, it could be that Parfit is pointing attention to the possibil-
ity that these ontological claims could be consistently held in the space of
metaethical positions. Although he writes that he believes there are such
abstracta (e.g. on p. 487), he might not be trying to convince us that abstracta do
in fact exist in the non-ontological sense. He would be right to draw attention
to this position, since this kind of non-ontological moral realism is a historically
unusual metaethical view. However, since he appeals to the truth of this view in
the dialectic with other metaethicists, simply pointing out that it is a possibility
would undermotivate their common ground.
However, Parfit need not be in either of these unsatisfying positions. We
should construe him as offering reasons and arguments to hold that the
existence of non-ontological abstracta is more plausible or more likely to
be true than the existence of ontological abstracta. I think that there are
two arguments that we could (re)construct which could support his claims.
However, I ultimately find neither successful. This matters because the tra-
ditional motivation for the denial of abstracta, a view which often goes by
‘naturalism’ or ‘nominalism’, is that abstracta are ontologically committal. So
the most important question is not whether it is more plausible that abstracta
are ontologically committal or non-committal, it is whether the possibility that
abstracta are committal should motivate a move towards rejecting abstracta
(and perhaps making morality mind-dependent in the manner of, for instance,
Street 2017). Examining these arguments can help us determine whether this
motivation remains.
3. Alternatives for abstracta
The first argument is an argument from elimination. Abstracta, including rea-
sons, logical objects and mathematical objects, can be said (truly) to exist; so in
which ‘sense(s)’ can this be the case? For Parfit, existence claims for abstracta,
such as ‘There is a number of people in Britain’, are true in the wide sense,
since we can make positive true claims about such numbers (regardless of
whether we do know the particular number at the time this claim is made). It
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cannot be true in the narrow actualist sense because this is correctly said only
of concreta, and we are considering abstract objects. Thus, we are left with the
narrow, non-ontological sense, which, he claims, is correctly applied to some
abstracta, including numbers, valid arguments and reasons. We can formalize
this as follows:
(1) Abstracta can correctly be said to exist.
(2) All things which can correctly be said to exist do so in some narrow
sense.
(3) Abstracta do not exist in a narrow, actualist sense.
(4) ∴ Abstracta exist in a narrow, non-ontological sense (by elimination).
The response to such an argument is equally clear: this argument form is only
valid under the implicit assumption that there are no other narrow senses by
which these existence claims about abstracta could be true.As hinted at above,
there is a large amount of logical space that is left for other senses. For instance,
his narrow, actualist sense about concreta could be contrasted with a narrow,
possibilist sense also of concreta. But, even with the addition of such a sense,
Parfit need not be troubled, since this would only apply to existence claims
about concreta, not abstracta.
But there could be another sense: a narrow, ontological sense which holds
of abstracta when they are said to exist in reality, but non-spatio-temporally.
That reality extends beyond space and time is at least conceptually possible –
on some readings of Plato, Platonic Forms are part of reality, but not in space or
time. As noted above, we can call those who endorse the addition of abstracta
(to non-spatio-temporal reality) Platonists.
Mathematical Platonists would hold that mathematical abstracta exist in the
wide sense (one can have positive true beliefs about them) but also in a narrow,
ontological sense for abstracta. In this manner, accepting the truth of their
existence commits one to adding more to one’s ontology, albeit in non-spatio-
temporal reality. Another way of putting this point is that, in contrast to Parfit’s
narrow, non-ontological sense, true existence claims in a narrow, ontological
sense have terms (for abstracta) that refer to objects in reality. On Parfit’s view,
the statement ‘There is a number of Little Pigs in the famous children’s story’
is true without needing to refer to something abstract in our ontology (i.e.
the number 3). However, for Mathematical Platonists, this statement would be
made true in an ontological sense by an object in some non-spatio-temporal
part(s) of reality (i.e. the number 3). In Section 6, I discuss some reasons for
thinking that Platonism about abstracta is a plausible position for the kind of
irreducible normativity that Parfit claims.
If we can understand this distinct ontological sense for abstracta, then this
argument from elimination is no longer (formally) valid, since it could be that
true existence claims about abstracta need not be understood in his narrow,
non-ontological sense. Both his non-ontological sense and the introduced
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ontological sense could apply to any given existence claim about abstracta,
so he needs further argument to show that his sense applies in general. For this
reason, he cannot rule out that reasons exist in reality, and that he incurs the
theoretical cost of introducing them into our ontology.12
In short, the challenge is that there is a coherent possibility that there could
be non-spatio-temporal parts of reality. Parfit’s response to this challenge is
that ‘We may find it hard to understand this claim’ or that ‘We can vaguely
understand the possibility that space and time are not metaphysically fun-
damental’ (484).13 But whether Parfit finds it hard to comprehend or not is
not a challenge, conceptually or metaphysically. It is true that, as we do not
experience any part of reality that is not spatio-temporal, it is difficult for us
to show or demonstrate that there are such parts of reality. But that does not
prove that such views are false, let alone incoherent. We can illuminate this by
comparing this claim to claims which have structural similarities.
For instance, Parfit calls himself a Possibilist (Appendix J). The Actualist holds
that there is nothing beyond the actual world, whereas Parfit qua Possibilist
claims that there are also (in the wide sense) merely possible objects and/or
worlds. From the Actualist’s point of view, it may also be ‘hard to understand’
Parfit’s claim – after all, merely possible objects don’t exist in actuality, so
how do they exist? Parfit and some others are motivated to accept that there
are possibilia in reality because when making certain judgements, such as
counterfactual judgements, we seem to commit ourselves to them.
However, the Possibilist may stand in a similar relation to the Actualist as
the Platonist to the Nominalist. The Possibilist might claim against the Actualist
that some of our judgements commit us to a reality containing possibilia.
Similarly, the Platonist might claim against the Nominalist that, when making
certain normative judgements, or mathematical judgements, we seem to be
committing ourselves to a reality containing certain abstracta.
Here is another similarity. We cannot experience non-spatio-temporal parts
of reality or detect them through empirical means, since all that we sense
is, by definition, spatio-temporal. We also cannot experience non-actual parts
of reality or detect them through empirical means, since all that we sense
is, by definition, actual. As Parfit holds, ‘We [Possibilists] believe that being
actual is ontologically very different from being merely possible’ (728); similarly,
Platonists believe that there being abstracta is ontologically very different from
there being (merely) concreta. In particular, they would both be (ontologically)
in different parts of reality – namely, non-spatio-temporal regions and spatio-
temporal regions.
Obviously, it may be simpler to imagine possible worlds which are meta-
physically similar to the actual world than non-spatio-temporal regions of
reality. This is part of why Plato appeals to metaphors and myths (such as
comparing the Sun with the Form of the Good) when discussing the Platonic
heaven of abstract objects. However, simply because it is challenging to expli-
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 713
cate what such an ontology would look like should not lead us to reject the view
as impossible. Once again, my intention is not to show here that Platonism is
true, just that saying that it is a difficult or challenging question does not
mean that it is not what Parfit calls a ‘Clear Question’. If it is conceptually or
metaphysically coherent, I believe that we should accept that there is a ‘Clear
Question’ about whether abstracta exist in an ontological or non-ontological
sense just as there is a ‘Clear Question’ about whether or not there are possibilia
– something clear enough that Parfit even thinks he has the answer.
4. How sensible is this sense?
How could Parfit respond to the possibility of an ontological sense? In this
section, I discuss a first type of response, following Manley (2009), which tries
to show that the distinction between non-ontological and ontological senses
for abstracta is problematic. Perhaps, in appealing to the ‘unclarity’ of the
ontological question, Parfit means that the question is problematic in one of
these ways. In particular, Parfit could argue that the distinction is either (a) ill-
formed or (b) a merely verbal distinction, without any substance. Manley says
that these are diagnoses that could be offered of some ontological debates,
and Parfit has the resources to offer both of these objections, although I think
that both charges can be decisively answered.
Let us begin with the claim that the introduced sense is somehow ill-formed.
Parfit holds that claims such as the claim that ‘Abstracta exist ontologically’ are
unclear like the claim ‘There are some headaches which are correct, and others
which are mistaken’ (477). This latter sentence seems to be a case where the
claim is unclear because a category mistake is being made; headaches are not
the type of entity which admit of correctness.14 For instance, one might think
that this could be because ‘correct’ (respectively, ‘mistaken’) is a normative
predicate and headaches do not admit of normativity in this manner.
However, taking this position requires that it is acceptable to the parties
in the debate that it is a category mistake to attribute ontological existence
to certain types of abstracta. Otherwise, it would not be unclear in the way
that the headache attribution may be unclear. But this is not acceptable to the
parties involved: in fact, this is what is at issue between an ontological quietist
like Parfit and more ontologically profligate Platonists. Merely asserting that
this is a category error is not sufficient in a dialectical situation where it is a live
question. The Platonist would not accept that it is a category error to attribute
ontological existence to some abstracta; this is precisely what she believes to
be true! For Parfit to say that her theories are incomprehensible would certainly
not be granted.
Here is another possibility: it could be unclear because of the unverifiability
of headaches, due to their only being present in the phenomenology of a
particular individual. I am not sure that this is the case; headaches could have
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complex neural bases which are in principle empirically discoverable. Let us
grant the objector this point and set it aside. The analogous charge would
be that we cannot determine – empirically, for instance – whether or not
abstracta add to our ontology. In at least the empirical sense, it is accurate to
say that we cannot determine the answer; this is why we consider arguments
in metaphysics.
Perhaps Parfit intends this to be unclear in some further, distinct way, but
then it is up to him or others to explain this distinct way.
We can now consider a second strategy which Parfit could use to object to
the narrow, ontological sense; namely, that it appears distinct from his narrow,
non-ontological sense, but that this apparent distinction cannot be understood
or collapses under examination. This point can be drawn from an exchange
between Dorr and Parfit.
Dorr (2008, 61) writes that ‘numbers and properties are not part of the
ultimate furniture of reality . . . there are, in the final analysis, no such things.’ In
this passage, Dorr can be understood as denying that there are true mathemat-
ical existence claims in my narrow, ontological sense. In response, Parfit oddly
construes Dorr as denying the claim that numbers are spatio-temporal:
When Dorr refers to the ultimate furniture of reality, he might seem to be referring
to the ultimate constituents of what exists in the spatio-temporal Universe. But
Dorr would not then be rejecting Platonism, since Platonists do not believe that
numbers exist in space or time. Since Dorr cannot be using ‘reality’ to refer only
to the spatio-temporal Universe, his remarks do not sufficiently explain what
Platonists assert, and Nominalists like Dorr deny. (478)
Parfit is correct in holding that, if Dorr’s thesis was that numbers are not part of
space-time, then this would not be a denial of mathematical Platonism, since
Platonists agree that numbers are not part of space-time. But this is not Dorr’s
thesis at all; he is explicit that it is ‘obvious’ that numbers are not concrete. And
it is not mysterious what Dorr holds: Dorr’s claim is that there are no numbers
in reality, i.e. he denies that there are (a) non-spatio-temporal parts of reality
or (b) objects in such parts. In the very first sentence of that essay, Dorr states
his thesis: the view that “the world of material objects is the whole of reality”
(58, emphasis his). To determine what he is denying, we need only negate this
claim. That there are numbers in reality is precisely what Platonists assert and
Nominalists deny.
So althoughParfit claims that it is not explained what the difference between
Platonism and Nominalism is, we can see that at least one way of drawing
the distinction is whether or not the spatio-temporal parts of reality exhaust
reality. This is unsurprising, since it corresponds directly to whether there are
true existence claims understood in a narrow, ontological sense for abstracta
or whether all existence claims about abstracta must be understood in Parfit’s
narrow, non-ontological sense.As Dorr suggests, one way of allowing abstracta
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into our ontology is to admit that there must be non-spatio-temporal parts of
reality.
5. Getting something from nothing
The second argument that Parfit might offer grants that there could be this
ontological sense for abstracta and that it differs from Parfit’s senses but that
this is an unnecessary distinction, a point which he thinks is shown by a thought
experiment. This thought experiment, Parfit thinks, helps establish that the
ontological sense is empty; no abstracta exist in this ontological manner as I
suggest they could. I call it the Argument from Empty Ontology:
A proof [that abstract numbers exist non-ontologically] may be possible partly
because it is not true that numbers exist in an ontological sense. We can accept
Dorr’s claim that there could not be a priori arguments which showed that
anything exists in such a sense. But this sense of ‘exists’ is not, I have claimed, the
only important sense. If nothing had ever existed in any ontological sense, there
would not have been any stars or atoms, nor would there have been space, or
time, or God. But it would have been true that nothing ever existed. As we can
also claim, there would have been the truth that nothing existed in an ontological
sense. This truth would have existed in a different non-ontological sense. And
there would have been many other truths, such as the truths that there are prime
numbers greater than 100. (485, his emphases)
The thought experiment is quite simple. Abstract objects, like numbers, truths
about them, and truths about the world, would exist (‘in a non-ontological
sense’) even if there were an empty ontology. From this we can infer that
existence claims about abstracta are true without requiring any ontology, i.e. in
Parfit’s ‘non-ontological sense’. So we can excise abstracta from our ontology.
However, the Platonist could disagree in at least one of three ways de-
pending on how the argument is construed. First, let us suppose that all
truths are abstracta. Then as soon as these truths exist, for the Platonist,
they exist ontologically, but outside of space-time. Thus, strictly speaking, this
thought experiment would not involve an empty ontology, since it describes
there being abstracta and the Platonist holds that abstracta are ontologically
committal. More importantly, if numbers are similar to truths in virtue of their
abstractness, then this is not a proof that numbers exist non-ontologically. The
Platonist could admit that there are numbers, but that, like the truths, they are in
our ontology, but outside of space-time. So, if the truths are abstracta, then the
Platonist would not have to agree that this was an empty ontology. In other
words, the Platonist could object that the thought experiment is question-
begging or not correct as described.
Second, let us suppose that not all truths are abstracta. For instance, they
could just be regions of reality.15 In that case, normal spatio-temporal facts are
not abstract at all, they just are the parts of the world. Then, of course, the
Platonist could think that the fact that the ontology is empty just is the empty
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ontology.16 So the ontology really could be empty, as Parfit claims. But it is
not the case that the empty ontology just is moral or mathematical truths. The
Platonist could think that there are moral and mathematical facts which are
regions of reality, but then they would be part of non-spatio-temporal regions.
So either the ontology is truly empty, in which case the Platonist would deny
that there are mathematical abstracta, or the ontology is not truly empty (just
the spatio-temporal parts) and, once again, the thought experiment is not
correct as described.
However, there is another, more direct objection that the Platonist could
offer which is independent of whether truths are abstracta or not.17 As Parfit
claims, and I am inclined to grant, mathematical truths are true in every
world. In other words, suppose everyone is committed to there being some
abstracta in every possible world (with mathematical objects being obvious
candidates, and normative objects being other candidates), even though what
constitutes their ‘being’ is under contention. Then Parfit’s Empty Ontology
world is incoherent for the Platonist, and not an admissible point against them.
Of course, Parfit could respond that his intuition is that it is possible, which
shows that Platonism is false. However, the Platonist can offer a potentially
debunking explanation of this intuition that the Empty Ontology world is a
possible world, even though Platonism does not allow for it.
In other words, a Platonist could offer an explanation of why it is that the
Argument from EmptyOntology appearsplausible or valid, as follows. When we
are talking about an empty ontology, we usually imagine no spatio-temporal
universe. The Platonist could agree that some existence claims about abstracta
could still be true even with an empty spatio-temporal region (although in this
case they would think that abstracta would still exist in the narrow, ontological
sense, not in Parfit’s non-ontological sense). But if we mean an entirely empty
ontology such that reality has neither spatio-temporal parts nor any other parts,
then it would no longer be quite as self-evident.
6. An argument from truth
Parfit and his Platonic interlocutors agree on the value of introducing irre-
ducibly normative objects (abstracta) into moral theory; once we have them,
we can make strong claims about the objectivity of morality, grounding its
potential demandingness and its supposedly mind-independent status. Of
course, it is possible to retreat to some form of naturalism, but Parfit is worried
that if naturalism is true, then nothing would really matter. While I am not
convinced of that claim, let us grant it to him here for the sake of argument
and proceed as if naturalism is a non-starter. That leaves us with the Non-
Metaphysical Cognitivist and the Metaphysical Cognitivist positions, which I
introduce below.18 Given the arguments in the previous sections, which show
that Parfit has failed to demonstrate the superiority of his Non-Metaphysical
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Cognitivism over Metaphysical Cognitivism, are there positive considerations
that also lead him towards accepting the more ontologically committal po-
sition? In this section, I argue that there are. Basically, Parfit’s claims about
truth and his strong normative commitments are difficult to reconcile with
any theory of truth and push him towards the strong correspondence theory
he wishes to avoid (745f). While I lack the space to be exhaustive here, I can
indicate how some commonly accepted theories of truth fare with regard to
Parfit’s metaethical commitments and the difficulties he will have in trying to
adopt them.
Parfit is clear that accepting the truth of claims about concreta imply that
they must be introduced into our ontology:
We are Cognitivists about some kind of claim if we believe that such claims can
be, in a strong sense, true. Many such claims have metaphysical or ontological
implications. In trying to decide whether these claims are true, we must answer
some questions about what exists, in an ontological sense. That is true, for
example, of claims about concrete entities, such as rocks, stars, philosophers
and bluebell woods. And it may be true of all claims about the natural properties
of what exists in the spatio-temporal world. When we believe that claims can
be in a strong sense true, we are Metaphysical Cognitivists about such truths.
(479, his emphases)
In order to accept that existence claims or just ordinary claims with referring
terms about concreta are true, we need to answer ontological questions about
those concreta. The truth of these claims depends on the existence of the
objects that they refer to.
But, according to Parfit, the same is not true of some claims about abstracta,
since he is a Non-Metaphysical Cognitivist about them:
There are some claims that are, in the strongest sense, true, but these truths have
no positive ontological implications . . . When such claims assert that there are
certain things, or that these things exist, these claims do not imply that these
things exist in some ontological sense. (479)
My argument draws on the tension between these two statements. Consider
Parfit’s commitment: truths about abstracta and concreta are both ‘in the
strongest sense’ true. This first indicates that the appropriate theory of truth
should be singular. Consider the possibility that truth could be pluralistic.19
While this is probably not consistent with Parfit’s own views – after all, he
adverts to truth in the strongest sense20 – it is a position which one could
hold which might appear to vindicate his views (I will argue it would not).
In this context, the primary metaethical concern is that, if normative truths
are not in any way part of reality, then it is difficult to imagine that they
could satisfy the conditions that Parfit desires, such as mind-independence
and objectivity.21 However, here are a few further considerations which count
against truth pluralism. First, truth pluralism will make truth ambiguous. As the
‘Quine–Sainsbury objection’ holds, differences in domains do not automatically
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motivate truth pluralism. It could instead motivate an examination of the differ-
ences between the concreta and abstracta themselves (Quine 1960; Sainsbury
1996). Second, there is the issue of claims which have mixed domains, ranging
from atomic sentences (Tappolet 1997) to molecular sentences. In short, if
truth is plural, how come we can use these sentences to instantiate standard
valid argumentative forms? On truth pluralism, such arguments would require
conflation of the types of truth involved. Finally, pluralism about truth is difficult
to square with the usual assumption that truth is a norm for belief (for recent
discussion, see Chan 2013). If truth is plural, then this threatens to dilute the
norm, or to rob it of substance (Engel 2013). There are responses to these
claims that the pluralist can offer, but I take these considerations to render the
position unattractive. Furthermore, even if Parfit bites these bullets and adopts
truth pluralism, it still must be explained which form of truth is applicable in
the case of abstracta.
This commitment to truth’s ‘strongest sense’ also suggests that Parfit cannot
accept theories of truth which we might think of as broadly procedural.On such
theories, truth depends on prior commitments. It is easy to see why he cannot.
As soon as truth is dependent on prior commitments, the necessity and mind-
independence of truth – both of whichParfit prizes – would be threatened. Two
dominant forms of such procedural theories are pragmatism and coherentism
about truth. We can gloss these theories as follows: pragmatists believe that
truth is that which it is expedient or instrumentally valuable to believe (cf.
James 1907, 34) while coherentists believe that truth is that which coheres
with some other set of claims, usually sets or subsets of antecedentally held
beliefs. Both types of theories would render moral claims relativist (either to
the circumstantially instrumental value of accepting or to the appropriate sets
of beliefs), which is an implication Parfit is at pains to reject throughout On
What Matters.22 Furthermore, such theories of truth are intuitively not ‘strong’
senses of true, at least if we assume that strength requires independence
from the instrumental value of accepting a claim or from other beliefs one
antecedentally holds.23 Finally, accepting such theories would be antithetical
to the independence of truths about abstracta adverted to in the Argument
from Empty Ontology (cf. Section 5). If normative truths were relative to the
value of accepting them or to other sets of beliefs, then the Argument from
Empty Ontology – which is meant to secure truths about abstracta across
possible worlds – would instead undermine those truths. An empty ontology
lacks anything to ground instrumental value for accepting a given normative
truth or a set of antecedentally held beliefs with which a given normative truth
could cohere. Another way of making the point is that if normative truths are
necessary truths, it will be hard to accept truths which have relative truth-
conditions. For these reasons, we should reject these theories of truth about
normative claims, or at least Parfit should reject them.
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Another popular set of theories of truth Parfit could turn to are theories of
truth we call deflationary.On such theories, the truth of a proposition is nothing
above that proposition (in slogan and schematic form, for any sentence S, ‘S’ is
true if and only if S).24 I think that such theories are also not true ‘in the strongest
sense’. If truth adds little or nothing to a claim, this intuitively suggests truth is
weak, not strong, or at least that there are stronger theories available. However,
as Suikkanen (2017) has pointed out, there is a more important difficulty
for Parfit here.25 Accepting deflationary theories of truth leave Parfit with a
dilemma that reduces his ability to separate his metaethical position from
others.
Suikkanen’s dilemma for Parfit is whether or not to align a deflationary
theory of (normative) truth with a deflationary theory of (normative) facts.26 A
deflationary theory of facts holds that these facts would not be a genuine part
of reality whereas an inflationary theory holds that they would be in some form.
The idea here is that, given the maturity of certain metaethical positions, it has
become more difficult to distinguish different metaethical theories from one
another and that deflationism about truth makes this even more challenging
for Parfit because he lacks a tool that can be used to distinguish substantive
commitments. Suppose, for the first horn of the dilemma, that Parfit were to
combine a deflationary theory of truth with a deflationary theory of facts. If
there were no claims about the ontological status of normative facts, then
the Non-Metaphysical Cognitivist would not be able to distinguish themselves
from the Metaphysical Cognitivist – both would hold that normative claims
are true and both would hold that normative facts are deflated. The Non-
Metaphysical Cognitivist could not say that the Metaphysical Cognitivist is
adding extra facts because there would be no extra ontological commitments
that the MetaphysicalCognitivist would have over and above those of theNon-
Metaphysical Cognitivist or, more specifically, not any that could be discussed
in these doubly deflationary terms. Since Parfit wishes to carve this Non-
Metaphysical from the Metaphysical position in the metaethical space, he
cannot accept this implication.
The other horn of the dilemma is to adopt deflationism about truth but
an inflated theory of facts. On this view, truth would add nothing to the
normative claims, but facts would require some kind of ontological com-
mitment. However, given Parfit’s claims that there are no such ontological
commitments, there would be no normative facts. Note that this contrasts
with Metaphysical Cognitivists, who hold that there would be such facts.
However, Parfit’s commitments would lead to adopting a form of normative
error theory.27 An error theory is a metaethical position whereby there are no
moral or moral facts in reality, although we take moral claims to be states which
are beliefs (and not desire-like). So while accepting deflationism about truth
means that truth could still be predicated of normative claims, there would be
no normative facts. In short, it would be possible to endorse normative claims,
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and since truth is (accepted to be) deflationary, it would be correct to endorse
the truth of normative claims. However, they would not comport with any
normative facts in reality, collapsing the position into an error theory. I take it
that Parfit would wish to deny this position, since avoiding normative nihilism
is a major motivation for him and error theory seems to be much closer to
nihilism than he would wish to be. The upshot is that deflationism about truth
would either collapse the view that Parfit is attempting to carve out, or would
lead to the commitments of a theory he wishes to avoid, namely, error theory.
This discussion is meant to show that Parfit cannot accept theories of truth
which are procedural, in the sense of dependent on prior commitments. Nor
can he adopt theories of truth which are deflationary. Although I lack the
space to be truly exhaustive here, the other broad set of theories of truth
are inflationary.28 The most influential such theory is the correspondence
theories of truth. Correspondence theories hold that there is some relation
(‘correspondence’) between (parts of) reality and claims such that when the
correspondence holds, the claims are true. Parfit explicitly denies this theory of
truth, giving it the name ‘alethic realism’ (745). On the positive side, it would of
course vindicate his MetaphysicalCognitivism about concreta.On the negative
side, it would be similarly inflationary for abstracta. It would saddle him with all
the ontological commitments he wishes to avoid.
So it also would be difficult forParfit to accept inflationary theories. However,
I think that some type of inflationary theory of truth is still best for Parfit if
he wants to maintain the objectivity and robustness that abstracta provide
him.29 In contrast, if he accepts a procedural theory of truth, then the implicit
references to agents or believers would render the theory too relativistic and
contingent for Parfit. A deflationary theory of truth would make it difficult to
distinguish his views from other metaethical theories. Of course, adopting an
inflationary theory is a result that Parfit explicitly wants to resist. However, I
think it is the cost that a theory which generates things which really matter – in
the very strong sense Parfit wants – must pay.
7. On why ontologymatters
Parfit’s ethical and metaethical project is built on the importance of reasons,
which are truths that he claims have special, irreducibly normative properties –
namely, the property of being reasons. This strong commitment to irreducibly
normative properties puts dialectical pressure on Parfit to admit them into
reality, for instance, as theoretical posits.
Of course, if reasons exist in reality, then they are quite different from other
objects that exist. Many have worried about this kind of existence (Blackburn
2017; Lenman 2009; Mackie 1977), but Parfit holds that, although they exist in
the ‘wide sense’, they do not exist in an ‘ontological sense’. This, he believes,
allows him to meet the dialectical pressure but still maintain an ontologically
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cost-free metaethics. This matters for the central claims in metaethics because,
if my arguments are successful, there remain reasons of parsimony to prefer
naturalist and nominalist metaethics over the kinds of non-naturalism that
Parfit and others favour. This is especially the case if the only type of truth
which vindicates Parfit’s claims is inflationary.
One way to object is to adopt the arguments of Quine (1960) that existence
claims are univocal, but for the sake of argument I have granted to Parfit
that ‘existence’ has these different senses. The problem is that merely having
access to different senses does not make the problem go away; senses can be
introduced that make the problem recur.
The metaethical compatibility that Gibbard and Railton find their views have
with Parfit is motivated by his cost-free claims (Gibbard 2017; Parfit 2017a;
Railton 2017). Thus, it behoves us to examine the justification for these claims,
especially given that Parfit’s combination of a strong cognitivism with a cost-
free ontology is quite a new innovation. Considering the potential for this
position is a fruitful way of determining whether we should reconsider the
metaethical space that we had before Parfit’s important contributions.
Notes
1. For the sake of argument, I grant Parfit this irreducibility, which has been
questioned, to my mind most persuasively, by Smith (2017).
2. I use the term ‘existence truths’ to refer inclusively both to true claims using
forms of the verb ‘to be’ and ‘to exist’ – for instance, when Parfit says that there
are several ‘senses’ of ‘exists’, he means to make similar claims about ‘senses’ of
‘there are’. I adopt his inclusiveness. Also, unless specified, all references in this
essay are to Parfit (2011).
3. Although I do not think that much hangs on my usage of these terms, I take
reality to be the singleton actual world (for theActualist) or the mereological sum
of some set of possible worlds including the actual world (for the Possibilist, like
Parfit); worlds may contain spatio-temporal parts and/or non-spatio-temporal
parts. Ontology, on this construal, is the study of what is in reality.
4. Scanlon (2014) and Putnam (2004), for instance, also combine non-ontological
commitments with objective moral claims. However, I will argue that Parfit’s
position is different (and stronger) in holding that, at least, many concrete
objects exist in an ontological sense, whereas Scanlon and Putnam’s positions
imply that (non-relativized) ontological questions are incoherent or ill-formed
tout court. So, for instance, I think Parfit would (rightly) reject a ‘pragmatic
pluralism’ which made reasons simply part of the language game we play
because these would relegate claims about reasons to a relativistic sense of
‘true’ which could not play the objective role that Parfit desires (cf. Putnam
2004, 22). I expand on these claims in Section 6.
5. In addition, Parfit (2017b) thinks that Copp (2017) converges to his own view.
Copp holds that, in inflationary (‘worldly’) terms, normative facts are natural
whereas in deflationary (‘propositional’) terms, normative facts are non-natural.
Parfit takes this to indicate that Copp is on board with (or at least congenial
to) normativity of a non-naturalist stripe but Copp demurs both in Copp (2012)
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and private correspondence, holding that the worldly sources of normativity are
entirely natural and that this is what is relevant for ontology.
6. For instance, Quine (1960) and Sainsbury (1996) object that we could address
different ontological considerations by appealing to the differing ways in which
abstracta and concreta come to exist as opposed to positing different senses of
‘exist’.
7. Although I use the term ‘Platonism’ following Parfit, Platonists may or may not
be followers of Plato himself; in this context, they are meant merely to hold a
particular metaphysical position about the ontological acceptance of abstracta.
8. Oddly, his statement of his view compares things that exist concretely (concreta)
with truths about abstracta (like mathematical and logical entities) instead of
with the abstracta themselves. It is accurate that truths about such abstract
objects are themselves abstract, but his passage still makes for an unneces-
sarily confusing juxtaposition. I take this confusion to be not of fundamental
importance, so references in this essay to truths about abstracta and abstracta
themselves are not distinguished.
9. My granting Parfit the ‘Plural Sense View’ is a substantial admission. As Olson
(forthcoming) points out, it is not clear what to make of his wide non-ontological
sense of ‘exist’ and, furthermore, it’s not properly motivated. It is not properly
motivated because Pafit could make sense of his puzzling claims about possible
objects (721ff) by allowing that possible objects exist, but that they do not
actually exist while retaining a ‘Single Sense View’. However, I grant Parfit this
substantial Plural Sense View for the sake of argument.
10. This is very curious terminology, since the necessary truths about abstracta must
also be actually true. This follows from their necessity (under the assumption
of Reflexivity, which Parfit accepts). So ‘actuality’ is not what distinguishes
his narrow senses. I suppose that the ‘narrow actualist sense’ is meant to
be contrasted with an ontologically lesser ‘narrow possibilist sense’ but Parfit
nowhere mentions such a sense.
11. I am inclined to believe that Parfit’s writing that they exist ‘at some time’ in space
and time is accidental redundancy.
12. Indeed, we can go further and see that some of his claims appear to commit him
to their existence, as I discuss in Section 6.
13. Although the claim is not actually about fundamentality, but instead it is sup-
posed to be that space and time are not metaphysically exhaustive of reality.
14. Of course, it could be tempting to read Parfit’s claim as a claim not about
headaches, but about headache-reports, but this strengthens Parfit’s case: if we
tend to look at this statement as elliptical or incomplete in some way, that is
because it is very obviously not truth-apt so we are trying to read it charitably.
15. A view of this sort is defended by, for instance, Hornsby (1997).
16. Here, we can think of the ‘part’ of the empty ontology as not a proper part, but
the whole.
17. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of argumentation.
18. Here we are also granting, for the sake of argument, that we want to avoid adopt-
ing both error theories and non-cognitivist positions. For Parfit’s breakdown of
the metaethical conceptual space, which I am also granting him, see Parfit (2011,
263). Also, in Parfit (2017a), some of the terms for metaethical positions are
slightly different from Parfit (2011); in particular, “Metaphysical Cognitivism”
is replaced with ‘Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ and ‘Non-Metaphysical Cog-
nitivism’ is replaced with ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’. Yet another term in the
literature for similar metaethical positions is ‘Quietist Non-Naturalism’. I use and
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 723
prefer Parfit’s original nomenclature, but one can substitute one’s own preferred
terms throughout without affecting any of my claims.
19. A full examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this essay. However, an
excellent summary of the current state of play about truth pluralism can be
found in Pedersen and Wright (2013), and I do discuss some reasons to resist the
view in the following.
20. It is logically possible that both MetaphysicalCognitivism andNon-Metaphysical
Cognitivism are about truth in the strongest sense, but that is because there
are distinct, equally strongest, senses of truth! It is unclear what kind of scale
would be able to compare strengths of truth, but any plausible scale would
make inflationary theories of truth (roughly, theories that require ontological
commitment for truth) stronger than deflationary theories (roughly, theories
that do not require ontological commitment), so the problem for Parfit recurs:
if truth is inflationary for concreta, then it must be inflationary for abstracta.
However, he is denying this.
21. Here, I am agreeing with Parfit that the quasi-realism espoused inter alia by
Blackburn (2017) does not generate the kind of mind-independence and objec-
tivity that Parfit takes to be desiderata.
22. One possible retort on behalf of the coherentist is that the coherentist makes
claims cohere with only maximal sets of beliefs, but it is hard to see how sets of
moral claims would be fixed in this manner (for instance, it might be maximally
coherent that deontic statuses are inverted such that all right actions are wrong).
Thanks to Preston Werner for pushing this point.
23. We need not assume that correspondence is the correct theory in order to
recognize that, if it were true, it would be more demanding.
24. Theories of truth in this broad family include minimalism about truth, ex-
pressivism, prosententialism and disquotationalism. Many deflationists think
that the schema is not universally true, since there are problematic instances
of S which generate paradoxes. We need not concern ourselves with these
complications here.
25. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this helpful reference.
26. Some of the argumentation here is related to the influential (Dreier 2004).
27. Suikkanen (2017, 201) more specifically identifies the resultant view as a conser-
vationist version of error theory.
28. For an example of a theory of truth which does not fall under these three
categories, Suikkanen (2017) thinks that Parfit will be forced to adopt primi-
tivism about truth, on which truth is a predicate for which no theory will be
forthcoming. I agree with Suikkanen that this is very difficult for Parfit to accept,
since acceptance of this would commit him to a sui generis notion of truth which
is, at the very least, a cost for the theory. However, I disagree with Suikkanen
that this is the option Parfit would want to adopt. Parfit’s motivations suggest a
vindication of the robustness of abstracta. Stipulating that truth applies in these
contexts is not really a vindication if truth is a primitive. It certainly is insufficient
to ground the agreement that Gibbard and Railton have made with Parfit. When
Parfit writes that these truths have no ontological implications, he cannot defend
or explain this claim under truth primitivism. He can merely repeat it. To this the
Platonist can respond that this position is even more mysterious than the (wholly
intelligible, though surprising) ontological claims that she makes. Since Parfit
thinks that making ontological committal not a ‘Clear Question’ is a problem, an
even more serious charge could be levelled against him as a primitivist.
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29. It is more grist for my mill that (Enoch 2011) has an independent argument for the
moral realist being committed to inflationism about truths involving abstracta.
His argument is that just as we accept scientific posits into our ontology, we
should accept moral abstracta into our ontology since they can do similar
explanatory work.
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